subgame

The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is different with that in two-stage game with exogenous transportation costs.

并得到了与外生运输成本的二阶段模型不同的子博弈精炼纳什均衡结果。

Minimum-Maximum Method of Refining the Subgame Perfect Nash-equilibrium on the Out-of-Equilibrium Path

子博弈精炼纳什均衡非均衡路径极小极大化精炼法

By establishing two Subgame models on control contest, influences of capital structure from takeover threat in corporate control market are researched.

通过建立控制权竞争的两个子博弈模型，研究了控制权市场的收购威胁对于资本结构选择的影响；

( supervise, { not making false, making false}) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium;

（监督，{不作假，作假}）是子博弈精炼纳什均衡；

It is proved that the subgame perfect equilibrium result is unique under either condition. Then sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies of both sides are given out.

基于模型分别对不存在其他选择以及存在其他选择的情况进行了博弈分析，证明两种情况下都具有唯一的子博弈精炼均衡结果，给出了双方的子博弈精炼均衡战略。

Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash reversion to be a subgame perfect NE is proved.

然后证明了无限重复博弈中的纳什回归策略成为子博弈完美均衡的充分必要条件。

Simulation experiments model iterative process and acquire the solution of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.

仿真实验模拟了迭代过程，得到了子博弈完美纳什均衡解。